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Abstract
This paper sets out to discuss the extent of procyclicality in European banks’ lending 
behavior and how much the regulatory and accounting framework may contribute to it. 
The main focus is the behavior of banks regarding provisioning against impaired finan-
cial assets. It also discusses whether a through-the-cycle provisioning regime could serve 
as one of the possible regulatory responses to the ongoing financial crisis. Our applied 
analysis reveals that European banks are among those that provision in a procyclical 
manner. On the theoretical level, therefore, through-the-cycle provisioning could be help-
ful in creating a buffer during good times which could then be used during recessions. On 
the practical level, however, through-the-cycle provisioning would for numerous reasons 
be difficult to introduce soon and would first need to be aligned with the other com-
ponents of the international framework for accounting and for the regulation of financial 
institutions.
1. Introduction
The financial crisis in progress since summer 2007 has greatly increased 
the interest of regulators—and economists generally—in the issue of procyclical 
lending behavior of banks. In the preceding decade, the discussion had been focused 
on the options for dampening growth in the loan supply in an upward phase of 
the business cycle, whereas in 2008 attention also turned to a sharp slowdown—or 
even freeze—in lending at a time of recession. In order to influence lending over 
the cycle, various countries have in the past tried either to use changes in monetary 
policy settings or to apply prudential, supervisory, or even administrative measures. 
The bursting of housing market bubbles leading to the crisis in the residential 
mortgage market and the sovereign debt crisis opened the question of how much 
the regulatory and accounting framework itself contributes to procyclicality and 
credit risk myopia. The loss of confidence in the reported state of bank balance sheets 
in the euro area that escalated in 1H 2012 brought to attention not only the quality of 
loans, but also the adequacy of provisions against loans classified as non-performing 
(at default) over the cycle. Even though the issue is sometimes downplayed by “it’s 
* The authors would like to thank Vilma Dingová and Josef Brechler for assistance with data sources and 
Štěpán Radkovský for useful suggestions. They nevertheless note that everything contained in this paper 
represents their own views and not necessarily those of the Czech National Bank. All errors and omis-
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only accounting” statements, it has crucial importance for the resilience of the bank-
ing sector in particular. Provisioning is important not only because the provisions 
serve as a buffer against expected loan losses, but also because they provide sig-
nificant information on how banks price credit risk. Procyclicality in provisioning 
may therefore mean that during good times credit risk is underpriced, creating 
conditions for a credit boom followed by a costly bust during which credit risk is 
overpriced, thus contributing to negative developments in the real economy. 
A number of studies focus on provisioning in Asian and emerging economies 
(Craig et al., 2006; Angklomkliew et al., 2009; Fernández de Lis and Garcia-Herrero, 
2010; Floro, 2010). In the most recent study, Packer and Zhu (2012) found mixed 
evidence for countercyclicality in the provisioning of Asian banks. They show that 
countercyclical loan loss provisioning has dominated throughout emerging Asia. 
Loan loss provisioning did not simply become more conservative at all points in 
time subsequent to the Asian financial crisis, but actively leaned in a fashion that 
moderated swings in earnings and the macroeconomy. On the other hand, Japanese 
banks showed procyclical provisioning. Evidence is also available on advanced econo-
mies prior to the adoption of the IFRS and the crisis (Borio et al., 2001; Cavallo and 
Majnoni, 2002; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Bouvatier
and Lepetit, 2008). However, there is limited information on banks’ provisioning in 
European countries after IRFS adoption, including the period of the crisis. We try to 
fill the gap to some extent by looking empirically at the level of procyclicality in 
banks’ provisioning in the Czech Republic using supervisory data on the Czech 
banking sector. In addition, the findings for the Czech Republic are cross-checked by 
estimation of the same equation for selected European economies using publicly 
available data. 
This paper thus analyzes the cyclical behavior of bank loans and loan loss 
provisioning in the Czech Republic and selected European economies in order to 
discuss the possibility of applying through-the-cycle provisioning and the potential 
effects of such a step. Section 2 introduces the issues of procyclicality and through-
the-cycle provisioning as one of the instruments that might reduce the potential 
procyclicality of regulation. Section 3 examines bank loans and provisioning in
relation to the business cycle in an attempt to identify whether these variables behave 
procyclically. Data for banks in the Czech Republic and for large commercial banks 
in selected European countries are used for separate analyses. Section 4 discusses 
the possibility of implementing through-the-cycle provisioning in practice and 
comments on the debate between accounting standard setters and financial market 
regulators. Section 5 then concludes. 
2. Procyclicality and Provisioning Regimes
Financial system procyclicality means the ability of the financial system to 
amplify fluctuations of economic activity over the business cycle via procyclicality in 
financial institutions’ lending and other activities. The procyclical behavior of finan-
cial markets transmits to the real economy in amplified form through easy funding of 
expenditure and investment in good times and through financial restrictions leading 
to declining demand in bad times. In the search for potential remedies for procy-
clicality, or at least for tools for coping with its after-effects, regulators have opened
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Figure 1 Potential Events Resulting in Provisioning
Sources: Banque de France (2001); authors’ modifications.
a debate on through-the-cycle provisioning. The remainder of this paper is devoted to 
this topic. 
Banks set aside provisions to cover their expected losses. Their capital should 
primarily be used to cover unexpected losses. There generally exist several provi-
sioning systems, differing in either when the provisions are created and entered 
in the accounts or what event triggers provisioning (see Figure 1). The prevailing 
practice is “specific” provisioning. Specific provisions are fixed against losses on 
predominantly individually assessed loans and start at the moment an evident event 
occurs, i.e., in a situation where there is already verifiable evidence that losses will 
probably arise on the relevant loans. For this reason, specific provisioning is back-
ward looking (i.e., it identifies risk ex post) and should not be considered a buffer 
against future losses. General and through-the-cycle (dynamic) provisions, where 
permitted by the authorities, can be forward looking (i.e., they identify credit risk ex 
ante). However, the international accounting standards currently in force (IAS 39) 
allow banks to provision only for loans for which there is clear evidence of impair-
ment (i.e., backward-looking provisioning).
One can say—again simplifying somewhat—that specific provisions are 
created and entered in the accounts only after credit risk comes to light (which 
usually occurs in times of recession), whereas in the through-the-cycle provisioning 
system provisions are created when credit risk comes into being (i.e., to a large 
degree in times of boom). So, in the through-the-cycle provisioning system, banks 
provision against existing loans in each accounting period in accordance with 
the assumption for expected losses. At times when actual losses are smaller than 
assumed a buffer is created which can then be used at times when losses exceed 
the estimated level.
Certain features of through-the-cycle provisioning have been used by banks 
in some countries in the past on a voluntary basis (Frait and Komárková, 2009). 
Likewise, certain regulators have used methods based on assessing expected or 
potential losses and provisioning for those losses. However, it was not until 2000 in 
Spain that a comprehensive and mandatory system for the application of dynamic 
provisioning was introduced in order to reduce procyclicality in bank behavior 
(for details see Saurina, 2009; Balla and McKenna, 2009; or Wezel et al., 2012).1
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A similar approach was used in some Latin American countries (Ren, 2011). 
In the period 2000–2004, in addition to specific and general2 provisions against 
the profit-and-loss account, Spanish banks set aside “statistical provisions” (a statis-
tical estimate of long-term expected losses) to cover the latent risks on the different 
homogeneous asset portfolios. The statistical provisions had the nature of dynamic 
provisions, as they rose when the actual losses in a given year were lower than 
statistically predicted and fell when the actual losses were higher. The statistical 
provisions had a fixed upper limit and were not tax deductible. The system was 
introduced at a good time, i.e., well before the onset of the recession and financial 
crisis. This allowed a buffer to accumulate to cover future losses. The expected and 
desired result of this system was a reduction in the year-on-year volatility of bank 
profits.
The introduction of dynamic provisioning in Spain in 2000 was not easy. 
Banks had major reservations at first. Nor was it welcomed by the setters of interna-
tional accounting standards, who argued that it allowed manipulative adjustment 
of profits and thereby limited investors’ ability to assess the true financial condition 
of the bank. The counter-argument was that investors had information on both
specific and statistical provisions and were also aware of the relatively simple rules 
according to which the statistical provisions were created. As a result, they could 
easily discount the impact of the statistical provisions on the bank’s financial results 
in any given year and thus had enough information on the bank’s true financial con-
dition. In response to the introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), the provisioning system in Spain was modified in 2005, although even 
the new system retained certain features of dynamic provisioning. Statistical provi-
sions were “concealed” in the general provisions through comparison of the specific 
provisions actually set aside in a given period with the historical average of the spe-
cific provisions in each group of homogeneous loans. However, even this modifica-
tion failed to lead to agreement between the creators of international accounting 
standards and the Spanish authorities.3
The application of elements of dynamic provisioning enabled Spanish banks 
to build up quite a large buffer in the form of accumulated provisions in just a few 
years. Even after the 2005 reform, banks maintained a high level of provisions in 
accordance with the regulations previously in force and entered the financial crisis at 
the end of 2007 with a fairly sizeable buffer in the form of a general provision fund. 
At the start of 2008, non-performing loans were 200% covered in Spain, while 
the EU average was around 60%. Clearly, the accumulated provisions were not suf-
ficient to maintain the stability of the banking system, as the developments in 2011 
1 One of the primary reasons was the Spanish central bank’s concerns that amid rapid credit growth 
supported by declining interest rates connected with the introduction of the euro, the existing provisions 
greatly underestimated the extent of the potential credit risk. The fact is, however, that although in
the early years the system absorbed a significant proportion of banks’ pre-tax profits (around 20%), bank 
loans still grew at very high rates in this period (Caruana, 2005). This supports the hypothesis that credit 
booms are highly complex events that are difficult to influence with standard instruments.
2 General provisions were set as a fixed percentage of the specific asset class and were tax deductible.
3 The Spanish authorities regard the new system as being IFRS compatible. Referring to IAS 39 (point 64), 
they argue that the general provisions are the result of collective assessment for impairment, capturing 
incurred losses that have not yet been assigned to individual loans. They thus cover loans whose losses 
have not yet been individually assessed and loans that have been assessed but not identified as impaired.
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and 2012 revealed. This is sometimes interpreted as a failure of dynamic provision-
ing in Spain and as evidence that through-the-cycle accounting is not a viable 
concept. In our view this is not a correct argument. Spanish dynamic provisioning 
has to be assessed having in mind that Spain went through an exceptionally large 
boom and bust cycle which was macroeconomically determined (the effects of 
the euro adoption in a booming economy and a favorable external environment) and 
politically driven (fiscal policy not sufficiently tight and local support of large 
construction projects). The correct interpretation is that without the buffer of 
accumulated provisions Spanish banks would have been in a much worse position 
during crisis, especially given the slump in property prices and the potential depth 
and length of the recession (Jiménez et al., 2012). The pressure exerted on banks by 
the regulator to provision more was justified and should have been applied with 
greater boldness on a larger scale. But one cannot expect an economy to cope with 
dynamic cyclical upsurges like the one in Spain with just a single instrument. Such 
upsurges require a concerted set of instruments coordinated with macroprudential 
policies with some political support. 
3. Do Banks Behave Procyclically when Provisioning?
The goal of this paper is to look at the extent of procyclicality in bank lending 
and at the motives the banks may have to behave procyclically in pricing credit risk. 
One of the instruments for analyzing the degree of procyclicality in banks’ behavior 
is analysis of provisioning over the business cycle. Such analysis offers one of 
the best ways of studying the extent of procyclicality since, unlike the data on 
the quality of bank loans, the data on provisions are available in a standardized and 
comparable form. This section thus analyzes the cyclical behavior of bank loans and 
loan loss provisioning in the Czech Republic and selected European economies in 
order to discuss the true scope of procyclicality and the room for applying through-
the-cycle provisioning as a potential remedy for procyclicality, or at least for 
applying tools for coping with its after-effects. This is because if the analysis con-
firms that banks have a tendency to provision in a highly procyclical way, there is 
a case for a policy reaction, i.e., for setting a through-the-cycle provisioning regime 
(for a proposal, see, for example, Wezel et al., 2012). We believe that understanding 
the true extent of procyclicality in provisioning is a crucial factor in designing any 
regime of this sort. We therefore examine bank loans and provisioning in relation to 
the business cycle in an attempt to identify whether these variables behave pro-
cyclically. Data for the banks in the Czech Republic and for large commercial banks 
in selected European countries are used for separate analyses. 
Could a through-the-cycle provisioning regime be useful in small European 
economies like the Czech one? The answer may be conditional upon the level of 
procyclicality in provisioning. Figure 2 shows that there is a negative relationship 
between GDP growth and the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans in the Czech 
Republic for the period 1998–2012. This relationship, which should be a logical 
consequence of the prevailing IFRS-based provisioning system, will be subjected to 
an empirical analysis. The results should reveal the extent to which other factors 
affecting banks’ behavior constrain the aforementioned negative relationship. 
The creation of provisions—especially those directly linked to impaired loans 
(“specific provisions”)—can be affected by changes in the macroeconomic environ-
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Figure 2 Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans and GDP Growth
(Czech Republic, 1Q1998–3Q2012) 
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Notes: y-axis: GDP growth in %, x-axis: ratio of provisions to loans in %; only loans provided to real economy 
are included.
Sources: CNB; CZSO.
ment, the solvency of counterparties to lending transactions, the regulatory and 
taxation rules in force, and, last but not least, by the actual behavior of a particular 
bank in a given environment.4 Consequently, to examine bank provisioning over 
the economic cycle, one needs to use a model with variables that sufficiently reflect 
the changing quality of the loan portfolio. Studies that document a strong negative 
correlation of bank provisioning with the business cycle include Borio et al. (2001), 
Cavallo and Majnoni (2002), Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Bikker and Metzemakers 
(2003), and Craig et al. (2006). 
To examine the potential procyclical behavior of Czech banks and banks from 
some selected European countries, we applied the following model for loan loss 
provisions:
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Using this equation we try in a simplified way to determine banks’ depend-
ence on the business cycle when provisioning. In other words, we determine whether 
there is a significant relationship between bank provisioning (the left-hand side of 
the equation) and proxies for the business cycle (the right-hand side of the equation). 
An important aspect when looking at this dependence is the timing of provisioning 
with respect to the business cycle and the related issue of procyclicality, which is 
generally associated with risk-based capital regulation.
The variables in the equation can be divided into (i) macroeconomic vari-
ables—the growth rate of real GDP per capita (ln GDP) and the unemployment gap 
(UNEMPL_gap5)—and (ii) bank-specific variables—the ratio of loan loss provisions 
to average total assets6 (LLP/TA), real loan growth (ln LOANS), pre-tax earnings 
4 A low-market-share bank will clearly behave differently from a systematically important bank, even if 
they operate in the same environment. 
5 The gap was used for the purposes of the model because the trend was too encumbered by sizeable 
growth in long-term unemployment. Using the Eurostat database, the long-term unemployment rate was 
deducted from the overall unemployment rate. 
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(EARN/TA), defined as the sum of pre-tax profit and loan loss provisions, and 
the ratio of equity capital to average total assets (CAP/TA). TA stands for average 
total assets for the current and previous year (0.5(TAt + TAt-1)). Some bank-specific 
variables are divided by total assets (TA) to allow for comparison across banks of 
different sizes. Subscript “t” denotes time, subscript “i” denotes an individual bank, 
and subscript “j” denotes an individual country. Lags of the dependent variable are 
included in the set of regressors to capture the effect of omitted explanatory variables 
and the persistence of LLP.
The growth rate of real GDP and the level of unemployment are used in 
the equation to proxy the business cycle. If banks behave procyclically, the rate of 
economic growth will be negatively correlated with provisioning, because an eco-
nomic downturn is usually followed by growth in the volume of provisions. In our 
model, economic growth is regarded as the main indicator of demand for banking 
services (including loans) and is thus a direct determinant of banks’ earnings. 
The unemployment rate should logically be positively correlated with provisioning. 
At a time of economic growth, unemployment falls and the number of creditworthy 
borrowers increases. Conversely, at a time of economic recession, unemployment 
rises and the probability of default increases. The unemployment rate follows GDP 
growth with a lag and affects banks’ earnings indirectly. It was included in the model 
because unlike GDP, which “only” indicates the degree of change in the business 
cycle, the level of unemployment shows the actual phase of the cycle.
The other variable in the equation is real loan growth, which we included in 
order to capture credit risk. Credit growth should tend to be positively associated 
with loan loss provisions (lower credit quality, i.e., higher credit risk, higher risk 
absorber). However, in some studies (e.g., Laeven and Majnoni, 2003) provisioning 
expenses vary negatively with loan growth, which is consistent with provisions 
declining even though surges in new loans might indicate increased riskiness. 
An increase in the loan growth rate (indirectly growth in credit risk) usually reflects 
over-optimistic expectations about future economic developments and future earn-
ings.7 Over-optimistic expectations and mis-estimation of credit risk, in turn, usually 
result in a low growth rate of provisions relative to loan growth. In other words, as 
credit risk increases, the level of hedging against it de facto decreases. However, 
the relationship between these factors might also be positive. If banks behaved 
prudently, as the dynamic provisioning model assumes, as credit exposures rose 
the provisions would also increase at least proportionally due to the elevated credit 
risk associated with tapping potentially risky borrowers. This model of behavior is 
considered less likely, though.
Another variable in the model is pre-tax earnings. Regulatory constraints on 
capital can motivate the bank manager to smooth earnings over time. In addition to 
meeting capital requirements, bank managers may smooth their income with a view 
to (i) positively affecting risk perceptions of the bank by reducing earnings vari-
6 We chose the ratio to total assets (the sum of the assets of all the banks under review) to allow for 
comparison across banks of different sizes.
7 Assessing developments can be more difficult in transforming economies, as the credit growth rate can 
be particularly high at the start of the transformation process owing to a low base, financial system 
development, and real convergence. In specific cases, therefore, it may be better to consider deviations of 
the credit growth rate from the trend.
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ability (Greenwald and Sinkey, 1988), (ii) optimizing tax expenditure (Rozycky, 
1997), (iii) minimizing the chance of being fired (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995), 
(iv) pursuing managerial self-interest, especially if their compensation packages are 
tied to income stability (Lambert, 1984) and other things (Laeven and Majnoni, 
2003). In general, banks with less volatile income tend to be regarded as good per-
formers, which then influences their share prices, external ratings, and external fund-
ing costs and ultimately also management incomes. The declared profit subsequently 
determines the amount of tax levied. Banks can influence their profit to some extent 
by adjusting the amount of provisions they set aside.8 If a bank smooths its income 
(or optimizes its taxes), it will reduce its “excessive” profits, which rise at times of 
economic growth, by means of increased provisioning, and vice versa. Given income 
smoothing, provisioning should be positively correlated with profits. With perfect 
income smoothing, earnings are either not affected or less affected by fluctuations 
in credit losses over the cycle. Loan loss provisions would increase in good times and 
decrease in bad times (Kim and Santomero, 1993)—they would be countercyclical. 
There is some evidence of the existence of earnings smoothing through provisions, 
at least for advanced countries (Pérez et al., 2008; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2003), 
whereas studies on emerging markets, especially in emerging Asia, have not found 
evidence of earnings smoothing (Leaven and Majnoni, 2003).
The final variable included is the ratio of equity capital to total assets. Loan 
losses are generally divided into expected losses and unexpected losses. Expected 
losses are assumed to be covered by provisions, whereas unexpected losses are 
assumed to be covered by capital. The equity capital to total assets ratio is therefore 
an important indicator of the capacity of a bank to absorb unexpected shocks. 
The relationship between provisioning and capital can be either negative or positive. 
If a bank takes into account its equity ratio when provisioning, the relationship 
between the variables is negative. The amount of provisions thus depends to some 
extent on the size of its capital buffer. If the bank decides that its capital buffer is 
large enough to cover any loan losses arising, as is usual at times of credit (eco-
nomic) expansion, its provisioning may be excessively low. When the business cycle 
changes, or if an unexpected shock occurs, the excessively low level of provisions 
may not be enough to cover the bank’s expected losses and it will be forced to cover 
them from its capital buffer. Its capital will thus be covering not only unexpected 
losses, but also expected losses, which may ultimately have an adverse effect on its 
capital adequacy compliance. By contrast, a positive relationship would suggest that 
provisions and capital are more or less independent of each other. The bank thus sets 
aside loan loss provisions no matter how large its capital buffer is. If we observe 
procyclicality in provisioning, a negative correlation can be presumed for the capital-
provisioning relationship. As the economy grows, the capital buffer of the bank 
expands and provisioning decreases. Regardless of their correlation, if both cate-
gories of shock absorbers (loan loss provisions and capital) are procyclical (more 
capital or provisions are required during recessions exactly because credit risks in 
banks’ portfolios increase in cyclical downturns) there might be an increased like-
8 It is worth noting that income smoothing is considered a violation of internationally accepted accounting 
standards (IFRS or IAS 39). There is a widely shared view within the accounting profession that income 
smoothing has negative connotations because it introduces judgmental modifications to a firm’s earnings 
and tends to reduce the comparability of results across firms and may impair shareholder’ equity.
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lihood of capital shortages during a recession potentially reducing the supply of 
credit to the economy (a so-called “capital crunch”).
We estimated the equation shown above with the generalized method-of-
moments estimator (GMM) developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998). As we assumed that all the independent variables are weakly 
exogenous, we instrumented them all. However, we are aware that from an econo-
metric point of view, the limited number of cross-sectional units in the sample poses 
additional limitations on the number of instruments that can be used in the estimation 
and subsequently on the number of exogenous variables that can be added to 
the equation. We have tried to keep to the suggested rule of thumb that the number 
of instruments should be less than the number of groups (only 15 in the case 
of the Czech Republic). The reason is that otherwise both the standard errors and 
the Sargan test are downward-biased and as a consequence the asymptotic inference 
maybe misleading. We cope with this problem by adding just three bank-specific 
variables at a time, reducing the need for extra instruments. The Sargan test of 
validity of instruments reached a satisfactory level, not robust but not weakened by 
too many instruments.
It is worth noting that the correlations between key explanatory variables, 
namely, GDP growth and bank earnings and GDP growth and growth of loans, might 
cause a multicollinearity problem in the econometric analysis, as they are in general 
expected to be positively correlated. However, our investigation into the data sug-
gests that the correlation between real GDP growth per capita and bank earnings and 
even between GDP and lending is not very high. There are substantial differences 
across banks even within the same economy, but multicollinearity is not a big issue 
in our analysis (see Appendix, Tables A2 and A4). 
To estimate the procyclicality in provisioning in the case of the Czech 
Republic, we used quarterly data for the period 1Q2001–4Q2011 from the balance 
sheets and income statements of 15 banks operating in the Czech Republic at the end 
of 2011.9 We realize that the results may have been partially influenced by the fact 
that the time period is not sufficiently long10 to represent the recommended two 
complete business cycles. The initial phase of the chosen period was additionally 
accompanied by structural problems in the banking system. However, the time period 
should be sufficient to test the behavior of the banking system over at least one cycle. 
The macroeconomic variables entering the model were taken from official Eurostat 
figures, and data specific to individual commercial banks were obtained from internal 
CNB sources. 
We hypothesize that a bank shows imprudent provisioning behavior if loan 
loss provisions are negatively associated with (i) GDP growth (ln GDP), or (ii) loan 
growth (ln LOANS), or (iii) banks’ earnings (EARN/TA). Thus, the key results of
9 We cleaned up the available data by removing banks/years with outlier observations so as to minimize 
the bias related to measurement errors. We calculated the 1st and 99th percentile values (see the Appendix)
of the variables. For bank-specific variables, if banks had an outlier observation that was smaller than 
the 1st or larger than the 99th percentile value, the whole record was removed from the sample. In order to 
ensure consistency, we also eliminated those banks which had less than four consecutive years of balance 
sheet observations over the sample.
10 Fernándes de Lis et al. (2001), for example, used Spanish data covering a 16-year period, representing 
two full business cycles. 
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Table 1  Loan Loss Provisions: GMM
CZ Other countries
LLP/TA(-1)
0,5456 0,2558
(0.0226)*** (0.1314)**
Δ ln GDP
-0,0020 -0,0003
(0.0006)*** (0.0000)***
UNEMPL_GAP
0,0031 0,0002
(0.0020)* (0.0002)
Δ ln LOANS
0,0001 0,0001
(0.0000)** (0.0000)
CAP/TA
0,0134 -0,1845
(0.0143) (0.0469)***
EARN/TA
0,4542 0,1670
(0.0285)*** (0.0571)***
# of obs 585 348
# of groups 15 36
# of instruments 13 13
Wald chi2(6) 7763,84 138,77
Prob>chi2 0,000 0,000
AR(1):z -7,90 -3,78
AR(1):Pr>z 0,000 0,000
AR(2):z -0,61 0,56
AR(2):Pr>z 0,542 0,577
Sargan test of overid. restrictions
chi2(6) 77,39 30,51
Prob>chi2 0,000 0,000
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5, or 10%.
interest in our analysis are the coefficients on GDP growth, pre-tax earnings, and 
loan growth. Table 1 presents the estimated results of the equation for the chosen 
sample. 
As expected, the coefficient on GDP growth was negative, indicating that 
provisioning is higher during economic downswings and lower during upswings. 
The positive coefficient on the unemployment gap also indicates that provisioning is 
procyclical and lacks forward-looking assessment of cycle-related risk. 
The procyclicality in banks’ provisioning behavior may be partly offset by 
the evolution of gross profit. Given its positive coefficient it is apparent that banks 
provisioned more as profits rose and less as they fell. The results thus suggest that 
banks tried to smooth their income (or optimize their taxes) in the period under 
review by provisioning. This behavior thus partially reduces the procyclicality expressed
by the coefficient on GDP growth. 
The positive coefficient for the relationship between provisioning and loan 
growth confirms a generally positive effect of credit risk. The coefficient indicates 
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that Czech banks tend to behave prudently to some extent. If a bank has a relatively 
large open credit position, for which there is a higher probability of rising credit risk, 
it sets aside more provisions.
The final relationship under review is that between the equity capital to total 
assets ratio and provisioning. In our model, the estimated coefficient on equity 
capital is insignificant. 
To sum up, the results confirmed the assumptions regarding the procyclical 
provisioning behavior of banks. This may indicate that the provisioning performed 
by Czech banks contains a cyclical component which might be smoothed to some 
extent by the introduction of through-the-cycle provisioning, for example. 
For comparison the paper analyzes the cyclical patterns of bank loan loss 
provisions followed by large commercial banks from selected countries of Europe.11
The empirical panel analysis covers eight economies, namely, Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Denmark, France, Hungary, Sweden, and Slovakia. The data for the eight 
foreign countries and 36 banks come from two sources: bank-level data are taken 
from the Bankscope database (loan growth, equity capital/total assets, loan loss 
provisions/total assets, and earnings before taxes) and macroeconomic data from 
the Eurostat database (real GDP growth per capita, the unemployment rate, and 
inflation). The data are available on an annual basis for a period of 12 years (from 
1999 to 2010). One may discuss whether it is appropriate to mix post-transitional 
countries and developed economies in one sample. As a matter of fact, the period 
selected covers only the post-transitional period for banks operating in the New 
Member States. Therefore, the banks in all countries in the sample operate in the same
regulatory and accounting environment and use similar risk-management ap-
proaches.12 In addition, the sample is dominated by German, Denmark, French, and 
Swedish banks (see the Appendix).13
We expected some of the results (Table 1) to be analogous with previous ones 
for the Czech banks. The results suggest that bankers from the other selected 
countries create on average lower provisions in good times and are then forced to 
increase them during cyclical downturns (see the significant negative coefficient on 
the real GDP growth rate). We also find a positive relationship between the ratio of 
loan loss provisions and bank earnings. This suggests that the European banks in our 
sample have followed an income-smoothing pattern on average. However, the coef-
ficient on the real loan growth rate is insignificant. The relationship between 
the equity capital to total assets ratio and provisioning is negatively correlated, 
11 This exercise is of secondary importance. It is more a cross-check of the evidence from the Czech 
banking sector. The reason is that while we are able to use detailed quarterly bank-to-bank information 
of supervisory quality for Czech banks, the Bankscope database allows to use only yearly data with 
a coverage which is far from complete.
12 The same applies to Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Since the subsidiary banks in these 
countries are owned by parents from advanced Europe, they use the models and approaches their parents 
apply in the home country. What is also very important is that there were major differences in the credit 
cycles in the period concerned, but these were not developing alongside the “GDP per capita” line. In 
other words, some advanced and converging economies went through credit booms, while some did not. 
13 Out of the 36 banks included, ten were from Germany, eight from Denmark, six from Sweden, and five 
from France. The weight of banks from other economies in the sample is thus minor. As with the Czech 
banks, we cleaned up the data for the other countries by removing banks/years with outlier observations to 
minimize the bias related to measurement errors. 
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supporting the assumption discussed above that European banks are influenced in 
their provisioning by their capital ratio. In other words, banks set aside fewer 
provisions to cover their expected losses when their capital buffer is larger. 
The selected European banks appear to have increased the amount of provisions 
during periods of positive profits, but have been less prudent during periods of 
economic growth. 
4. Potential Implementation of through-the-Cycle Provisioning and Its Barriers
The results of the above illustration represent a meaningful argument for 
putting through-the-cycle provisioning into accounting and regulatory practice. 
The lessons from the crisis were taken seriously by accounting standard setters, who 
acknowledged the shortcomings of the impaired loss approach. Facing criticism of 
the existing framework and the conclusions of a report produced by the Financial 
Stability Forum’s Working Group on Provisioning, the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) suggested a move to the expected loss (EL) approach in 
June 2009 as part of the IASB’s project on replacing IAS 39 Financial Instruments 
Measurement and Recognition. The EL approach represents a major deviation from 
the incurred loss approach, since no trigger for an impairment test is required. 
The IASB’s objective is to maintain a link between the pricing of loans and expected 
credit losses. In this respect, the EL approach should better reflect the economic 
reality of banks’ lending activities than the incurred loss approach, in that it requires 
earlier recognition of expected credit losses and should help avoid “incurred but not 
reported losses”. The EL approach appears to be rather simple. The present value of 
the expected future cash flows is measured using an initial internal rate of return 
calculated on the basis of cash flows actually expected at inception (taking into
account expected credit losses), and not on the basis of contractually agreed cash 
flows. The initial internal rate of return is thus lower than the contractual rate, with 
the difference representing the risk premium charged to the borrower in order to 
cover the statistically foreseeable risk of non-recovery. Any difference between cash 
flows received that represent contractual interest and interest calculated as revenues 
on the basis of the (lower) internal rate of return would be recognized in the balance 
sheet as a credit expected loss provision. Subsequent or additional impairment loss is 
recognized through continuous re-estimation of credit loss expectations. Reversal of 
impairment loss is entered as profit when there is a favorable change in credit risk 
expectations. In reality, the EL approach may be quite complex and could generate 
excessive subjectivity and credibility issues. Any expected loss model has to rely on 
judgment supported by a set of indicators. But the quest for a precise model of this 
sort can give rise to undue complexity. 
In addition, the debate on impairment accounting subsequently became 
dominated by an initiative of the IASB and the U.S. Financial Accounting Standard 
Board (FASB) aimed at reaching a common approach based on expected losses and 
amortized costs. Initially, there were major differences in the preferences of the two 
boards regarding a revised impairment model, and especially regarding the timing of 
recognition of estimated losses. Nevertheless, they issued a joint proposal in January 
2011 (IASB, 2011) as a “supplementary document” to their original proposals. This 
can be viewed as a step toward a common approach. The proposal would require 
an entity to determine an impairment allowance based on internal risk management 
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decisions to split financial assets into a “bad book” or “good book,” depending on 
the degree of uncertainty about the collectibility of the assets’ cash flows. An entity 
would be required to immediately recognize lifetime expected losses for assets in 
the “bad book.” For assets in the “good book,” an entity would recognize the higher 
of: a portion of lifetime expected credit losses determined under a time-proportional 
approach; and credit losses expected to occur within the foreseeable future (not less 
than 12 months). Later on, the IASB and FASB’s deliberations moved to a three 
bucket approach to capture the pattern of deterioration in credit quality. In this
approach, loans are classified into three categories depending upon their credit risk 
characteristics and any change in credit risk since origination. The level of provisions 
recorded would be expected to increase as credit deteriorates over time. Assets will 
begin in Bucket 1 and the measurement of impairment will be based on 12 months 
of expected losses. Assets will shift to either Bucket 2 or Bucket 3 if and when credit 
deteriorates. The measurement of impairment in Buckets 2 and 3 will be based on 
lifetime expected losses. Where there are no events with a direct relation to possible 
future defaults, loans will be placed in Bucket 1. Financial assets with insignificant 
deterioration in credit since origination or purchase for which entities expect to 
recover substantially all contractual cash flows may qualify for Bucket 1 measure-
ment. Assets will need to be grouped in pools with similar risk characteristics or 
analyzed at the individual level to evaluate if they meet the Bucket 1 criteria. Bucket 2 
or Bucket 3 is used for loans affected by events that have a relationship to possible 
future defaults, i.e., to a trigger event to which the default possibility of a portfolio 
of loans is sensitive. In Bucket 2, expected credit losses are not identifiable for indi-
vidual loans, whereas in Bucket 3 expected credit losses are individually identifiable. 
The boards have agreed that the impairment model will allow for migration of credit 
in both directions. In addition, they have agreed that the probability of default should 
be the predominant characteristic for determining the collectibility of cash flows.14
The IASB and FASB joint proposal thus better addresses prudential regu-
lators’ concerns about provisioning and brings accounting rules more into line with 
the proposal put forward by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in June 
2010 (BCBS, 2010). In this proposal, provisions are based on best estimates of 
expected credit losses built over the life of the loan at the balance sheet date 
considering the loss experience over the complete economic cycle. Provisions are 
generally built up progressively by allocating a share of the interest income over 
the life of the loan or loan portfolio to an allowance account at the time interest 
income is recognized. The BCBS also argued for the use of a simplified average 
loss rate, which would represent expected credit losses by loan type derived from 
historical experience based on some measure of actual losses and adjusted for current 
conditions. In an updated reaction to the boards’ new proposal, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2011) expressed its support for an approach that 
requires the recognition of adequate levels of provisions on the balance sheet to 
absorb all expected credit losses. Not reflecting an adequate level of an allowance for 
expected credit losses on the balance sheet could result in overstating the related 
14 The model will also be applied to debt securities. Debt securities may be evaluated individually or 
in the aggregate based on similar risk characteristics to determine whether the recognition of lifetime
expected losses is required. A predominant indicator for credit deterioration will be changes in 
the security’s fair value.
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asset balances as well as the yield on those assets in any given period in the income 
statement. This could be potentially misleading to investors, other users, and other 
market participants, while also raising the safety and soundness concerns of pru-
dential authorities. The BCBS underlines that incorporating a broader range of 
available credit information than presently included in the incurred loss model should 
result in earlier identification of credit losses. In this respect, the EL model should 
address the “too-little-too-late” problem of the incurred loss model, for which it is 
necessary to minimize the difficulties in moving from Bucket 1 to Bucket 2 (or 
directly from Bucket 1 to Bucket 3). 
Initially, it was hoped that existing approach would be replaced quite soon by 
the forward-looking countercyclical provisioning methodology being developed by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and IASB. However, the pace 
of preparation of the new approach is rather slow, partly because of a quest to make 
the U.S. and international rules compatible. Current expectations regarding the im-
plementation of the impairment package go beyond 2015. There are two reasons for 
this. First, the experience with previous attempts to align the FASB’s U.S. GAAP 
and the IASB’s IFRS is making many observers quite pessimistic. The grounds for 
pessimism were strengthened by a report on the IFRS issued by the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission in July 2012. Second, banks lack data on historical losses 
as well as the capacity to estimate expected losses. The upshot of this is that some 
national authorities may over time resort to interim measures similar to Spanish 
dynamic provisioning.
There is thus no current “best practice” for a through-the-cycle provisioning 
system, nor will there be for some time. Any country seeking to introduce one 
unilaterally would have to address a whole range of difficult questions.15 Current 
international accounting standards still constitute a major barrier to through-the-cycle 
provisioning, as the latter is not compatible with the former. Efforts toward isolated 
application at the national level may have negative consequences. What is more 
important, the introduction of through-the-cycle provisioning would not provide 
a remedy for many advanced countries in the next few years owing to the current 
phase of the credit cycle. It is impossible to create a fund of through-the-cycle 
provisions in a situation where the quality of bank portfolios has deteriorated 
significantly as a result of declining economic activity and deflated asset prices.
A key item for discussion is the true influence of through-the-cycle provi-
sioning on credit growth and bank stability. It is likely that during a strong boom 
the system would not provide a sufficiently strong negative incentive for banks as 
regards lending. Although it would help create a buffer for worse times, this buffer 
might prove to be inadequate in a deep recession anyway. In other words, through-
the-cycle provisioning can hardly alone prevent the negative impacts of strong booms 
followed by strong recessions. Other instruments besides through-the-cycle provi-
sioning can be used to curb the procyclicality in banks’ lending. A natural tool is to 
set capital requirements according to Basel III, including countercyclical capital 
15 One of the critical points is the method of estimation of the expected future loss. The first option is to let 
banks perform such estimates themselves on the basis of data on past losses and to have the regulator 
verify the models used. For numerous practical reasons, however, it might be more appropriate to base 
such estimates on standard assumptions set by the regulator, who would set risk weights for the individual 
asset classes. Mann and Michael (2002) discuss a whole range of such practical aspects. 
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buffers during a boom. This buffer could then be used at times of weaker growth or 
recession. The two instruments could be applied complementarily. There will also be 
additional tools available stemming from Basel III (upper limits on leverage ratios 
for individual banks) and from the European CRDIV/CRR package. On top of this, 
supervisors can apply a number of other tools in their macroprudential policies if 
needed (for a detailed description of the tools available, see Frait and Komárková, 
2012) or also employ the instruments of monetary policy (Frait et al., 2011). 
5. Conclusions
The main focus of this article was the through-the-cycle provisioning regime 
currently under discussion as one of the possible regulatory responses to the ongoing 
financial crisis. The objective was to look at the extent of procyclicality in provi-
sioning in European countries, since this is one of the crucial factors in designing 
through-the-cycle provisioning regimes. The analysis we applied revealed that 
the provisioning performed by banks from the Czech Republic and some other EU 
economies contains a cyclical component which might be smoothed to some extent 
by the introduction of through-the-cycle provisioning. We also found some features 
in banks’ behavior that partially reduce the level of procyclicality. Theoretically, 
therefore, through-the-cycle provisioning could be helpful in creating a buffer during 
good times which could then be used during recessions. From the practical perspec-
tive, though, the uncoordinated introduction of through-the-cycle provisioning at 
national level is hard to envisage for number of reasons. It is therefore necessary to 
wait for the outcome of the deliberations of accounting standard setters. 
No through-the-cycle provisioning regime can work as a magic wand for 
“making sure it won’t happen again”. Such regime can help in building up buffers in 
good times for helping to weather bad times. In the same way, it would not be 
realistic to expect through-the-cycle provisioning to be very effective in curbing 
credit booms. These are complex phenomena that need to be addressed by concerted 
set of policies and tools. In other words, if, in the future, the international economy 
starts undergoing a dynamic drive again, accompanied by credit and asset price 
booms, the authorities will have to apply set of microprudential and macropruden-
tial measures to tame the immoderate optimism. Factors mitigating procyclicality 
embodied in regulations will hopefully ensure that buffers are accumulated, and 
better supervision may prevent bank managers from taking excessive risks. Monetary 
policymakers might need to step in directly using the interest-rate channel or 
indirectly using prudential tools to change its transmission. Still, plenty of courage, 
luck and communication skills will be needed to succeed.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 Summary Statistics of Regression Variables: CZ
Mean Std.Dev. Min
Percentil
Max
0,01 0,25 0,50 0,75 0,99
LLP/TA 0,09 0,13 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,15 0,65 0,79
CAP/TA 0,42 0,52 0,27 0,03 0,07 0,14 0,62 1,69 1,76
EARN/TA 0,11 0,16 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,17 0,74 0,84
D ln LOANS 10,73 17,84 -51,18 -23,63 1,83 9,76 17,59 62,38 178,60
UNEMPL_GAP 3,66 0,75 2,00 2,00 3,30 3,80 4,00 5,30 5,30
D ln GDP 0,70 1,01 -3,40 -3,40 0,45 0,80 1,35 2,30 2,30
Note: No. Observation = 660.
Table A2  Correlation Matrix: CZ
LLP/TA LLP/TA(-1) CAP/TA EARN/TA D ln LOANS UNEMPL_GAP D ln GDP
LLP/TA 1,00
LLP/TA(-1) 0.98* 1,00
CAP/TA 0.74* 0.74* 1,00
EARN/TA 0.98* 0.97* 0,82 1,00
D ln LOANS -0.21* -0.22 -0.26 -0.22 1,00
UNEMPL_GAP 0.09* 0.09* 0,03 0.08* -0.09* 1,00
D ln GDP -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0,01 1,00
Note:*p-value is 0.05.
Table A3 Summary Statistics of Regression Variables: Other Countries
Mean Std.Dev. Min
Percentil
Max
0,01 0,25 0,50 0,75 0,99
LLP/TA 0,00 0,01 -0,10 -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,05
CAP/TA 0,04 0,03 -0,01 0,01 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,14 0,17
EARN/TA 0,01 0,01 -0,05 -0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,04 0,05
D ln LOANS 5,27 17,30 -80,01 -48,33 -2,01 0,49 12,30 63,76 107,56
UNEMPL_GAP 5,88 1,78 3,00 3,20 4,70 5,40 7,00 12,60 13,20
D ln GDP 1,51 2,75 -6,70 -6,30 0,30 1,80 3,25 8,30 10,40
Note: No. Observation = 432.
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Table A4 Correlation Matrix: Other Countries
LLP/TA LLP/TA(-1) CAP/TA EARN/TA D ln LOANS UNEMPL_GAP D ln GDP
LLP/TA 1,00
LLP/TA(-1) 0.5281* 1,00
CAP/TA 0,04 0,01 1,00
EARN/TA 0.12* 0.11* 0.68* 1,00
D ln LOANS -0.01 0,03 0.16* 0.14* 1,00
UNEMPL_GAP -0.03 -0.06 0,03 -0.06 -0.19 1,00
D ln GDP -0.09 -0.01 0.21* 0.23* 0.18* 0.03 1,00
Note: *p-value is 0.05.
Table A5 Geographic Distribution of Sample Banks
Country Number of banks
Austria 1
Belgium 1
Germany 10
Denmark 8
France 5
Hungary 2
Sweden 6
Slovakia 3
Total 36
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